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THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY 
UNION: A STANDARDS OR RULES-
BASED INSTITUTION? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
urope’s introduction of the euro into the Economic and 
Monetary Union (“EMU”) may represent the boldest eco-
nomic achievement of the last century.1  The magnitude of this 
venture, though economic in nature, also has vital significance 
in Europe’s plan to become an ever-larger international political 
leader.2  The euro zone consists of approximately two hundred 
ninety million people — a population comparable to that of the 
United States.3  The EMU also makes up more than 21% of the 
world Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”).4  In 2000, the EMU was 
responsible for 14.7% and 13% of the world’s exports and im-
ports respectively.5  These statistics invite the assertion that the 
European Union (“EU”) today shares several characteristics 
with other influential societies of the past6 that have success-
fully introduced new currencies.  The EMU may very well be on 
a path for continued future success; however, despite the prom-
ising facts mentioned here, the EU still faces numerous chal-
lenges including, the task of continuously reevaluating the rules 
  
 1. Robert Mundell, Making the Euro Work, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30 1998, 
available at 1998 WL-WSJ 3492150 (“Throughout history the world economy 
has seen a succession of important currencies that have attained the status of 
international currencies…[T]hese currencies have been associated with great 
powers in their ascendancy.  That was the case with the shekels, darics, 
drachmas, denarii, dinars, ducats, deniers, thalers, livres, pounds and dol-
lars.”).  
 2. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A GUIDE FOR AMERICANS ch. 3 (2002), at 
http://www.eurunion.org/infores/euguide/euguide.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 
2003) [hereinafter GUIDE]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Mundell, supra note 1.  Common factors which contributed to the suc-
cess of currencies in the past were: size of the transaction domain, a stable 
monetary policy, the power of the central state and the fallback value of the 
currency.  Id. The author also lists the absence of arbitrary exchange restric-
tions as a factor, but discounts it as inapplicable in his discussion on the EU.  
Id. 
E 
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which comprise the EMU.  Even in the wake of the recent suc-
cess of the euro, the EU may soon find that the very rules which 
form the EMU could result in harsh economic and political con-
flicts within the EU or worse yet — the eventual undoing of the 
EMU.7 
This Note will consider the alternative implementation meth-
ods of the EMU policies by considering the Stability and Growth 
Pact — one rule which has recently forced the EU to face sev-
eral difficult questions about its chosen methods of legislation.  
The discussion will focus on whether the EU should have taken 
a standard or rules-based approach in the creation of the new 
Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the future development 
and implementation of the Pact and other EMU laws.  Part II 
will introduce the European Union and its governing bodies.  
Part III will outline the legislation, background and present 
status of the Stability and Growth Pact.  Part IV will discuss 
the arguments for and against having a regime that is either 
standards or rules-based and go on to consider several theories 
which have further explored the standards and rules debate.  
Part V will attempt to classify the Pact as either a standard or a 
rule and discuss the two alternatives of jurisprudence with re-
gard to implementing the requirements of the Pact.  This Note 
will conclude by considering what lies in store for the EMU and 
whether a rules or standards-based approach will be the more 
suitable path to choose in future instances.  
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The EU came into existence upon the implementation of the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1993.8  It is a treaty-
based organization that directs economic and political coopera-
tion among fifteen European nations, though the “fundamental” 
goal was to create an increasingly stronger union among the 
  
 7. Werner Van Lembergen & Margaret G. Wachenfeld, Economic and 
Monetary Union in Europe: Legal Implications of the Arrival of the Single 
Currency, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 31 (1998). 
 8. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 1.  However, the process of integration be-
gan in the 1950s by six countries — Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lux-
emburg, and the Netherlands — as a post-war Western Europe took necessary 
steps in rebuilding its economy.  Id.  The six nations also pursued integration 
of both military and political resources.  Id.   Such efforts failed and unifica-
tion, at the time, was continued on the economic front alone.  Id. 
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nations of Europe.9  Through these efforts, the European Union 
has brought economic prosperity to Western Europe and helped 
bring stability to Central and Eastern Europe.10  In dealing with 
the monumental task of uniting Europe, the EU has five gov-
erning bodies: (1) European Commission (“Commission”); (2) 
Council of the European Union; (3) European Parliament; (4) 
European Court of Justice; and (5) European Court of Audi-
tors.11 Additionally, the EU also created the European Central 
Bank (ECB) following the establishment of the EMU.12  
The Commission drives EU policy13 by proposing legislation, 
bearing administrative responsibilities, and ensuring that the 
treaties are properly implemented.14  It also holds investigative 
powers and can take legal action against persons, companies, or 
Member States that violate EU rules.15  The Commission con-
sists of commissioners who act in the EU’s interest independ-
ently of the national governments, which make up the EU.16  
The Council of the European Union, the EU’s legislative body, 
establishes EU laws based on proposals submitted by the Com-
mission — the proposals and the subsequent laws must balance 
national and EU interests.17  The Council of the European Un-
ion consists of ministers from each Member State.18 Different 
ministers participate depending on the subject matter of a par-
ticular discussion.19  For example, the ministers of the Economic 
and Finance (“ECOFIN”) Council discuss economic and finan-
  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2.  Furthermore, a European Council con-
sisting of the heads of state and government of each Member State along with 
the Commission president holds summits twice a year in order to provide 
strategy and political direction for the EU as a whole.  Id. 
 12. Id. at ch. 3; Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 9.  
 13. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2. 
 14. Id.; EUROPA: THE EUROPEAN UNION ON LINE, at http://europa.eu.int/ 
eur-lex/en/about/pap/process_and_ players3.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003) 
[hereinafter EUROPA]. 
 15. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2. 
 16. Id.  In theory, the commissioners act in the interest of the EU alone, 
despite the fact that the governments of the Member States nominate them.  
Id. 
 17. Id.; EUROPA, supra note 14.  
 18. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2. 
 19. Id.  See also EUROPA, supra note 14.  The Council, the EU’s main deci-
sion-making body, is also referred to as the Council of Ministers.  Id. 
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cial affairs.20  The European Parliament can question both the 
Commission and the Council and has veto power over legisla-
tion enacted by the Council.21  The Parliament is the EU’s public 
forum as it is comprised of six hundred twenty-six members 
elected in EU-wide elections for five-year terms.22  The Euro-
pean Court of Justice is the EU’s “Supreme Court.”23  Lastly, the 
European Court of Auditors oversees the financial management 
of the EU budget.24 
Through these governing bodies, the EU initiated the process 
of establishing the “single market” of the EMU in 1990.25  
Though the introduction of the euro is the most noticeable re-
sult of the single market, it is actually the third (and final) 
stage of the transition into the EMU.26  The first stage of the 
process, which began on July 1, 1990, consisted of lifting re-
strictions on the movement of capital across national borders 
within the EMU.27  The second stage, which started in January 
1994, concerned setting up the European Monetary Institute in 
Frankfurt, which set the stage for the ECB.28 
The ECB now assists in the management of the euro by im-
plementing monetary policy for the whole EMU.29  The ECB, 
also based in Frankfurt, took over the fiscal duties of setting the 
interest rates in Europe from the national central banks of the 
Member States on June 1, 1998.30  The ECB, together with the 
  
 20. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2. 
 21. Id.; EUROPA, supra note 14. 
 22. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2.  The number of seats is to increase to 
seven hundred thirty-two due to the Treaty of Nice to take effect in 2005.  Id. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at ch. 3. 
 26. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 3 (“[T]he euro represents the consolidation 
of the European economic integration … [T]he euro is a palpable reality and 
contributes to a broader sense of European identity.”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 9; see also Mundell, supra 
note 1 (“A single currency implies a single policy.”); GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 
3, 7.  
 30. Dagmar Aalund, Investing in Euroland: What’s the Euro? And Other 
Common Asked Questions About the Planned Single Currency, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 28, 1998, available at 1998 WL-WSJ 18985895; see also Daniel Yergin & 
Joseph Stanislaw, Now Comes the Hard Part: The New Europe Poses Enor-
mous Challenges for the Welfare State, for Protected Companies and for Politi-
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national central banks of the Member States acting as agents to 
the ECB, will make up the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB).31  The function of the ECB is vital to the stability of the 
EMU and the performance of the euro since, “no currency has 
ever survived as an important international currency with a 
sustained high rate of inflation.”32  Thus, the ECB’s sole respon-
sibility is to keep prices stable.33 
However, the responsibility for the future of the euro does not 
totally fall upon the shoulders of the ECB.  In order to ensure 
economic stability within the EU the Member States must also 
uphold certain fiscal standards.  The nations must continue to 
practice economic discipline, or conflicts stemming from the 
stark economic differences among the many Member States will 
arise.34  The European Union encourages this level of discipline 
through two mechanisms.  First, the EU will refuse liability for 
the financial obligations of Member States, and, second, the 
Member States have agreed to the restrictions of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. 35   
III. THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT 
A. The “Pact” 
The EU developed the Stability and Growth Pact in order to 
foster consistent economic policies and to ensure budget disci-
pline throughout the EMU36 by requiring each Member State to 
  
cal Leaders, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1998, available at 1998 WL-WSJ 18985958.  
The president of the Bundesbank’s Central Bank Council will sit on the gov-
erning board of the European Central Bank, as will the presidents of the na-
tional banks of the twelve Member States.  Id.  
 31. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 9. 
 32. Mundell, supra note 1. 
 33. Aalund, supra note 30; see also Mundell, supra note 1 (“The ECB will 
have the same problems of monetary management as the Federal Reserve 
System in the U.S.”).  But see Aalund, supra note 30 (“The ECB isn’t a dupli-
cate of the U.S.’s Fed.  One of the most important differences between the two 
is their mandates.  Unlike the newly formed ECB, the Fed’s goal is to balance 
the objectives of price stability with those of employment and economic 
growth.”); see also Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 9. 
 34. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 31.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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keep its budget deficit at a minimal level.37  The Stability and 
Growth Pact consists of one Resolution and two Regulations 
from the European Council.38  The main component of the Pact, 
Council Resolution 97/C236/01 on the Stability and Growth 
Pact, requires that Member States keep their “medium term 
budgetary position close to balance or in surplus.”39  More spe-
cifically, each Member State must keep fiscal deficits below 3% 
of GDP.40  Failure to abide by this standard will trigger sanc-
tions imposed by the EU.41  At first glance, it may seem that the 
Pact forces Member States to take action to correct their budg-
etary positions in case of an excessive deficit.  However, the EU 
ultimately intended the Stability and Growth Pact to serve as a 
deterrent to induce Member States to avoid an excessive deficit 
in the first place.42   
Council Regulation 1466/97 of July 7, 1997 addresses the 
“‘strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and 
the surveillance and coordination of economic policies’”43 of 
Member States as contained in Article 103 of the EC Treaty.44  
The regulation improves the surveillance of the Member States’ 
economic and monetary positions by ensuring the flow of infor-
mation from Member States to the Commission and Council.45  
Essentially, the regulation outlines the rules concerning the 
content, submission, examination, and monitoring of each 
  
 37. Council Resolution 97/C236/01 on the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997 
O.J. (C236) 1. 
 38. RENEE SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 86 (1997). 
 39. Tina Winther Frandsen, The Stability and Growth Pact — Status in 
2001, DANMARKS NATIONALBANKEN, (2001), at  http://www.nationalbanken.dk/ 
nb%5Cnb.nsf/alldocs/Smonetary_review_3quarter_01/$File/nb04.htm. 
 40. The Case for Co-operating — Economic Focus, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 7247195 [hereinafter The Case for Co-operating]. 
 41. Jan Meyers & Damien Levie, The Introduction of the Euro: Overview of 
the Legal Framework and Selected Legal Issues, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 321, *8 
(1998). 
 42. Roger J. Goebel, European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the 
EMU Ever Fly, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, *39 (1998). 
 43. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 31–32; Meyers & Levie, 
supra note 41, at *8; Goebel, supra note 42, at *38. 
 44. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; SMITS, supra note 38, at 
87. 
 45. Goebel, supra note 38, at *42. 
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Member States’ “stability program.”46  The regulation requires 
that each Member State’s stability program contain: “(1) me-
dium–term targets for its public finances (which should include 
a budgetary position ‘close to balance or in surplus’); (2) the un-
derlying economic assumptions and the sensitivity of the pro-
jected budgetary and debt positions to changes in such assump-
tions; and (3) budgetary and other economic policy measures for 
achieving those targets.”47  The ECOFIN Council will review 
each Member State’s stability program,48 thereby providing the 
EU with an opportunity for early detection of significant devia-
tions from medium–term targets.49  Such deviations could lead 
to excessive budget deficits for Member States which, in turn, 
could eventually upset continued price stability within the 
EMU.50  The regulation provides the ECOFIN Council with the 
opportunity to issue early warnings when it detects any such 
divergences.51  
The second regulation, Council Regulation 1467/97 of July 7, 
1997, concerns “speeding up and clarifying the implementation 
of the excessive deficit procedure”52 as contained in Article 104C 
of the EC Treaty.53  The regulation provides a clear method for 
proposing and implementing prompt corrective actions within a 
year of the reporting of the excessive deficit.54  Upon reviewing 
the economic position of a Member State, the European Com-
  
 46. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32.  Member States not 
participating in the EMU must submit “convergence programs” which are 
similar to stability programs and subject to similar review by the EU.  Id. 
 47. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8 (citing Council Regulation 
1466/97 of 7 July 1997 Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Posi-
tions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, 1997 O.J. 
(L209) 1); SMITS, supra note 38, at 87. 
 48. Goebel, supra note 42, at *38; SMITS, supra note 38, at 87. 
 49. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; see SMITS, supra note 38, at 87 
(“[The council] can either endorse [the program] or make a recommendation 
that the program should be strengthened.”). 
 50. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32. 
 51. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8. 
 52. Id. (citing Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 Speeding Up and 
Clarifying the Implementation of Excessive Deficit Procedure, 1997 O.J. 
(L209) 6); SMITS, supra note 38, at 88. 
 53. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; SMITS, supra note 38, at 
88. 
 54. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; Goebel supra note 42, at 
*39; Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; SMITS, supra note 38, at 88. 
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mission will report to the Council of Ministers if an excessive 
budget deficit exists.55  The Council of Ministers will then make 
prompt recommendations for corrective measures to the Mem-
ber State56 with deadlines for implementing these proposals.57  If 
the Member State fails to take timely and adequate corrective 
action, the Council may impose sanctions.58  Sanctions would 
require that the Member State make an initial non-interest 
bearing deposit of .2 to .5% of GDP and a variable component of 
10% of the excess deficit.59  Until the Member State adequately 
corrects its budgetary position, it must make yearly deposits 
equal to 10% of the excess deficit over the 3% reference value 
from the preceding year.60  The deposits shall, as a rule, be for-
feited and converted into a non-recoverable fine, if the Council 
decides that the excess deficit has not been corrected within two 
years.61  The Council, however, may excuse an excessive deficit, 
if one occurs as a result of a “severe economic downturn.”62   
  
 55. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32. 
 56. Goebel, supra note 42, at *39. 
 57. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; see also Catch 2002 — 
Strains on the EU’s Stability Pact, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 2002, available 
at 2002 WL 7247543 [hereinafter Catch 2002]; SMITS, supra note 38, at 88 
(“Within four months of its decision that an excessive deficit exists, the Coun-
cil would decide whether effective action had been taken to remedy the situa-
tion … The period of time between the reporting date and the decision to im-
pose sanctions is not to exceed ten months.”). 
 58. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; Goebel, supra note 42, 
at *39.  
 59. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; see also Catch 2002, supra note 
57; SMITS, supra note 38, at 89. 
 60. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; SMITS, supra note 38, at 89 n.304. 
 61. Goebel, supra note 42, at *39; Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; see 
also Catch 2002, supra note 57; SMITS, supra note 38, at 89 n.304. 
 62. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8.  A severe economic downturn is 
defined as a Member State experiencing an “‘annual fall of real GDP of at 
least 2%,’” or if the Member State provides evidence that an annual reduction 
in GDP of less than 2% is “nonetheless sufficiently exceptional in character.”  
Goebel, supra note 42, at *8.  It has been agreed that Member States should 
not invoke this last clause unless sufficiently severe cases occur during a drop 
of real GDP of .75% or more.  Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8. 
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B. The History of the Pact 
The German Minister of Finance initially proposed the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact in 1995.63  During the preparations of the 
European Commission and the European Monetary Institute, 
which took place between 1995 and 1997, in anticipation of the 
EMU, German representatives fought for strict standards re-
quiring Member States to maintain budget discipline upon join-
ing the monetary union and to keep their respective deficits 
low.64  
The Germans believed that monetary stability could not be 
achieved without rigid spending discipline.65 Germany feared 
that weak budgetary rules,66 combined with the historic liberal 
fiscal policies of several of their fellow Member States, would 
severely impact the value of the euro.67  Germany reasoned that 
weak budgetary rules would tempt Member States to borrow 
and spend at the expense of the other Member States thereby 
increasing interest rates, sparking inflation and undermining 
the new EMU currency.68  Moreover, default by a Member State 
  
 63. Goebel, supra note 42, at *63 n.265; see also SMITS, supra note 38, at 
84. 
 64. Goebel, supra note 42, at *38. 
 65. Matthias Herdegen, Global Economy, Lean Budgets, and Public Needs, 
53 SMU L. REV. 543, 550 (2000) (“This discipline is the most important com-
ponent of solidarity within the ‘compound’ or the European Union.”); see also 
A Survey of EMU: Maastricht Follies, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 11 1998, available 
at 1998 WL 8884807 [hereinafter Maastricht Follies] (“Excessive public bor-
rowing always weakens a currency.”). 
 66. SMITS, supra note 38, at 84; James Graff, Loosening the Ties That Bind: 
Europe’s Big Economies Can’t Keep Their Deficits Down, So Brussels is Chang-
ing the Rules, TIME INT’L, Oct. 7, 2002, at 56. 
 67. Could the Euro’s Nuclear Option Ever be Used? — How Credible are the 
Rules for the Euro?, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
7245002 [hereinafter Rules for the Euro]; see also Catch 2002, supra note 57 
(“The idea of the pact is to prevent governments running loose fiscal policies 
at the expense of other euro-area countries.”); Christopher Rhoads et al., 
Germany: Economic Has-Been? — Once Europe’s Growth Center, Nation Finds 
Stagnation in Norm, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 
3406672.  
 68. Maastricht Follies, supra note 65; see also Gambling on the Euro: 
Europe’s Monetary Union is Neither Bound to Succeed Nor Doomed to Fail.  
Leadership, Circumstances and Luck Will Combine to Decide Its Fate, THE 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7361239 [hereinafter Gam-
bling on the Euro] (“The concern was that chronic overborrowers would be-
come even more fiscally irresponsible once they had adopted the euro, because 
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could result in a political catastrophe for the EMU in terms of 
the credibility of the euro.69  Members would have the luxury of 
setting fiscal policy with the mindset of “when the chips are 
down the union will act as lender of last resort,” which would 
further reduce the need for fiscal adjustment.70  The Germans 
felt that this “free rider” problem brought with it the probability 
of both a reduction of currency and default in the monetary un-
ion making additional centralized control essential.71  
Of course, not everyone felt the same way.  For example, 
many other Member States pushed for a more liberal resolution 
to the issue of inflation and stability within the EMU.72   Repre-
sentatives of several Member States were fearful that since 
they would no longer have independent monetary or exchange–
rate policies leaving their countries with only fiscal policy as 
one of a few ways to counter a recession.73  The Pact interferes 
with a Member State’s automatic stabilizers.74  Due to the re-
  
they would no longer face the financial-market sanction of higher interest 
rates and (in the end) a depreciating currency.”); Trust or Mistrust Thy Euro 
Neighbour?, THE ECONOMIST, July 21, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7319878 
[hereinafter Trust or Mistrust]. 
 69. Mundell, supra note 1. 
 70. Id.; see also Trust or Mistrust, supra note 68.  One additional consid-
eration was the possibility of a trend starting and three or four countries run-
ning a lax fiscal policy as opposed to one or two obviously aggregating the 
problem.  Id. 
 71. Mundell, supra note 1 (“…hence, the Stability and Growth Pact”); see 
also Gambling on the Euro, supra note 68 (“Moreover this overborrowing 
would henceforth be at least partly at the expense of Germany and the other 
euro countries, because they would bear some of the cost of default, if it came 
to that.”). 
 72. Goebel, supra note 42, at *38.  France was the strongest proponent for 
a more liberal “Pact.”  Id.  See also Jennie James, We’re Off to See the Wizard: 
Critics Say the European Central Bank Should Use Its Powers to Lift Europe 
Out of Its Slump.  The Bank Says That’s Not Its Job.  Who’s Behind the Cur-
tain, Anyway?, TIME INT’L, Oct. 7, 2002, at 58 (“The U.S. Federal Reserve 
doesn’t have an inflation target, which gives it leeway in pursuing its dual 
mandate of price stability and maximum employment.”). The Fed’s reported 
unofficial goal of inflation is below 3%, while the ECB’s is 2% — inherited 
from Germany’s Bundesbank.  Id. 
 73. Maastricht Follies, supra note 65; see also Gambling on the Euro, supra 
note 68 (“In the meantime it rules out counter-cyclical fiscal policy or the sort 
that will often be necessary, and for which there is no longer any plausible 
national substitute.”). 
 74. Maastricht Follies, supra note 65.  See Re-engineering the Euro, THE 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7247884.  Built-in or “auto-
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quirement that their deficits do not exceed 3% of GDP, as tax 
revenues decline and deficits naturally increase during a reces-
sion, the Pact forces the governments of Member States to 
tighten spending when government spending is most needed.75 
Members also saw the need for a less strict agreement for 
reasons somewhat removed from the Pact itself.  Since the 
Maastricht treaty provides that the ECB cannot bail out Mem-
ber States, the market would attach a risk premium to lending 
to a heavily indebted government.76  Third parties would hesi-
tate before lending to those governments with high debt creat-
ing a market effect that would most likely serve as an incentive 
to national governments to keep their debts lower in order to 
remain competitive with their neighbors for foreign invest-
ments.77  Additionally, these members pointed out that the the-
ory behind the EMU was that the “balance-of-payments among 
its members will be automatic” as it is between regions within a 
single country.78  A government whose country has an excessive 
budgetary deficit will begin to spend less money in order to re-
duce its deficit.79  While these events take place in one country, 
a government whose country is in a period of recession will 
spend more money, invariably raising its deficit and thereby 
creating a balancing effect.80  The situation, many European 
nations feel, reduces the need for further centralized control.81   
The debate on the Pact resulted in a compromise.  As outlined 
above, the compromise called for extensive surveillance on the 
fiscal conditions of Member States in order to foresee serious 
budgetary problems and a range of possible sanctions to be im-
  
matic” fiscal stabilizers include the automatic decline in taxes and increases 
in welfare benefits during a recession.  Id. 
 75. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74. 
 76. Gambling on the Euro, supra note 68; Europe’s Adventure Begins, THE 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7361264. 
 77. Gambling on the Euro, supra note 68; see also Mundell, supra note 1 
(“A monetary union removes a major source of macroeconomic instability by 
barring central bank financing of fiscal deficits.  [As] governments will no 
longer be able to run up large public debts and force the central bank to in-
flate their burden away, it [is a move toward] fiscal prudence.”).  
 78. Mundell, supra note 1.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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plemented should budgetary deficits exceed prescribed limits.82  
Though the Pact is strict, Members now have the opportunity to 
implement corrective measures thereby preempting the need for 
such sanctions.83   The Pact also shelters the EU from short-
term internal political pressures and fortifies the independence 
of the ECB.84  However, the real tests on the viability of the Pact 
and the strength of the EMU prompted by social and economic 
expectations of the participating governments and their people 
seem to be at the EU’s doorstep.85     
C. The European Union Under the Pact 
The novelty of the Pact understandably spurred uncertainty 
as to how strictly the European Commission would construe the 
rules embodying the Pact.  Also uncertain was whether or not 
the Commission would require any Member State to pay a fine, 
should it fail to meet its obligations under the pact.  These un-
certainties gave rise to speculation that countries could allow 
their budget deficits to exceed 3%, if they agreed to compensate 
for the lapse during a later (more prosperous) economic period.86  
However, in the latter part of 2001, in the midst of a global eco-
nomic slowdown, the Commission issued a pronouncement 
which quelled much of the speculation of the Member States, as 
it provided insight into how strictly the Commission would con-
strue the provisions of the Pact.87  The Commission warned the 
eleven countries, then part of the euro zone, not to allow their 
budget deficits to exceed 3%.88  The director general of the 
Commission’s Economic and Financial Affairs directorate, at 
the time, further stated that the Commission would take a hard 
stance against Member States that did not abide by the budget-
ary restrictions of the Pact.89   
True to the statements of the Commission and the director 
general of the Economic and Financial Affairs directorate, in 
  
 82. Goebel, supra note 42, at *38. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Herdegen, supra note 65, at 554. 
 85. Id. 
 86. David I. Oyama, EU Warns Countries Not to Exceed Limits on Budget 
Deficits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29679248. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.   
 89. Id. 
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January 2002, in the midst of much concern over the future 
credibility of the euro,90 the European Commission issued a re-
port in which both Germany and Portugal received admonish-
ments for their growing deficits.  The deficits at the time were 
2.7% and 2.2% GDP respectively.91  The commissioner responsi-
ble for monetary and economic affairs reported that several 
Member States had not met their targets as outlined in their 
budgetary plans required by the Stability and Growth Pact.92  
The Commission asked for more control by Member States over 
government spending and pointed to Germany and Portugal 
because their deficits were dangerously approaching the 3% 
GDP limit.93  The European Union finance ministers issued 
formal warnings to the two nations upon the recommendation of 
the European Commission.94 
On February 12, 2002, the European Union’s finance minis-
ters declined to issue a further formal warning against Ger-
many in exchange for the government’s commitments to take 
unspecified “‘discretionary measures’” in order to bring its 
budget “close to balance” by 2004.95  The compromise accom-
plished two goals by allowing Germany’s chancellor to preserve 
his integrity while also protecting the financial discipline of the 
euro zone.96  Although the European Central Bank Chief, Wim 
Duisenberg said, “the compromise worked in the end,” the deci-
sion may have represented a setback for the European Commis-
sion in terms of its authority under the Pact.97  The Pact pro-
  
 90. Brandon Mitchener, EU Commission Warns Countries on Big Deficits, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3384521.  At the time, 
the euro had fallen about 15% against the dollar since its inception in 1999.  
Id. 
 91. Michael R. Sesit, In the Euro Zone, Sectors Now Have More Effect Than 
Borders, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3384681. 
 92. Mitchener, supra note 89. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Sesit, supra note 91.  The Commission did not want global confidence 
in the euro to weaken (initially Germany’s fear) with the perception that 
slower economic times would invariably intensify government spending.  
Mitchener, supra note 90. 
 95. Paul Hofheinz & Christopher Rhoads, EU and Germany Reach Deal on 
Deficit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3385880.  The 
“discretionary measures” would possibly include cuts in spending or higher 
taxes.  Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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vides that the Commission may recommend that the Council of 
the European Union issue warnings to Member States when 
their budget deficits approach 3% GDP — only in this instance, 
the recommendation went unheeded.98  Furthermore, the 
Bundesbank Vice President Juergen Stark said the European 
Union’s decision against issuing a warning to Germany may 
have hurt Europe’s “budget credibility” — an opinion to which 
Bank of America’s then current chief economist for Europe 
agreed.99   
Later in the year, another Member State’s financial activity 
drew similar concerns from the rest of the EU.  The French gov-
ernment, in hopes of inciting an economic growth spurt, cut in-
come taxes by 5%.100  The concern was that the move would fur-
ther hinder France from keeping its budget deficit below the 3% 
ceiling, since their deficit had been growing at a rapid rate and 
was projected to reach 3.2%.101  The French managed a small 
diversion from the negative attention by stating that they could 
still keep their deficits below the 3% limit of the Pact through 
surpluses in local authority finances and other areas.102   
By August 2002, Germany’s deficit was at 2.8%103 and by Sep-
tember Germany announced that its budget was 3.5%104 in the 
first half of the year and was ever closer to breaching the limits 
of the Pact.  Similarly, Portugal admitted to a budgetary deficit 
of over 4%, and concern for France and Italy’s budget deficits 
  
 98. Id. 
 99. Paul Hofheinz & Christopher Rhoads, EU Cuts Estimate of Annual 
Growth to a Paltry 0.9%: Recovery is Not Expected to Begin Until Early 2003; 
U.S. Exports Could Be Hit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL-
WSJ 3405460; see also Rules for the Euro, supra note 67.  If the EU govern-
ments’ finance ministers reject the Commission’s recommendation that Ger-
many should be formally warned, “the whole stability pact would begin to 
unravel.”  Id. 
 100. David I. Oyama, French Budget Relies on Growth, Includes Tax Cut, 
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3400314. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. The Case for Co-operating, supra note 40. 
 104. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99.  Germany’s budget was 3.7% in the 
second half of 2001 which means the country’s deficit was, in fact, over the 
limit for a twelve-month period.  Id.  However, a reprimand and fines occur 
only when the 3% limit is violated for a full fiscal year.  Id. 
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grew as well.105  By the end of September, the four countries, — 
which include the three largest economies in Europe — were off 
their budgetary targets.106  Although the European Commission 
acknowledged that the region’s economic downturn played a 
role in the countries’ budgetary woes, the Commission also 
blamed the countries’ “lack of fiscal prudence” during better 
economic times.107  Sirkka Hamalainen, a member of the ECB’s 
executive board, asserted that “governments didn’t realize or 
didn’t accept fully, that during the good times it’s very impor-
tant to build buffers.”108   
Despite the ongoing finger pointing, in light of the probability 
that an economic recovery would not begin at least until the 
following year,109 and due to the state of the budgets of these 
four countries, the European Commission agreed to extend the 
deadline of having budgets “close to balance” by 2004 to 2006.110  
Still, adding to the surprise of many doubters (including several 
economists) Wim Duisenberg insisted that current interest 
  
 105. The Case for Co-operating, supra note 40.  Concern for France’s budget 
grows despite the French Prime Minister’s assurance that his country’s 
budget deficit would not exceed the 3% limit.  Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 
99.  Italy, the third largest economy in the EMU, had also been causing con-
cern throughout the year due to its large deficits.  Germany Breaks With Debt 
Policy: A Wall Street Journal News Roundup, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3408813. 
 106. Room for Improvement — Europe’s Economies — Is the Spate of Elec-
tions in Europe this Year Going to Alter the Region’s Economic Prospects?, THE 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7245476. 
 107. David I. Oyama, EU Commission to Extend Target On Budget Deficits, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WS 3406974 [hereinafter 
Oyama, Commission to Extend Target].  Germany, France and Italy are also 
blamed for continuing protectionist practices for domestic industries thereby 
applying “yesterday’s remedies to current problems.”  Re-engineering the 
Euro, supra note 74.  Some say these giants should note their smaller broth-
ers who have enjoyed faster economic growth while still successfully abiding 
by the Pact’s budgetary requirements — all while practicing policies of liber-
alization, opened economies, reformed labor markets and welcomed competi-
tion.  Id. 
 108. James, supra note 72. 
 109. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99.  The European Commission also cut 
its forecast for euro-area economic growth for the year by half a percentage 
point to 0.9%.  Id. 
 110. James, supra note 72; Oyama, Commission to Extend Target, supra 
note 107; Catch 2002, supra note 57.  Governments of the European Union are 
supposed to have their budgets in balance by 2004 as a condition under the 
Stability and Growth Pact.  Id. 
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rates (established by the ECB) would promote price stability 
over time.111  It seemed the Pact that aimed to protect the large 
economies from the small economies is now protecting the 
smaller countries from the larger countries with past records of 
stability.112  The events lend evidence to the claim that the Pact 
had indeed gone “awry.”113   
Clearly the Pact needs reform.114  Though Germany had ini-
tially feared the effects of excessive inflation on the euro, reces-
sion now plagues the EMU.115  It seems that the Pact, written to 
combat inflation, has worsened the economic slowdowns in 
Germany, Portugal, France and Italy.116  Interest rates were 
higher than if monetary policy had been set by each country on 
its own, and, as a result, the economies were squeezed.117  The 
Pact forces governments to tighten fiscal policy at precisely the 
time when spending is needed the most.118  For these reasons, 
the voices of skeptics of the Pact could again be heard chiding 
the strict budgetary requirements.119  A UBS Warburg econo-
mist in London has referred to the Pact as a “busted flush.”120  
The European Commission’s very own president has been 
quoted as calling the Pact “stupid,” and some economists have 
  
 111. James, supra note 72. 
 112. Graff, supra note 66.  Representatives from smaller countries have 
gone as far as to claim that the Pact has created a “two-class” system with the 
larger states not having to abide by the same budgetary restrictions as the 
smaller states.  Id.  The fact that Portugal has undergone formal sanctioning 
does nothing to quell the vehement nature which exists throughout several 
other members in the EMU since Portugal is understandably considered one 
of the “smaller” guys.  Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74. 
 115. Double-dip in Germany? — Europe’s Slowing Economies, THE 
ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7247193. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74; Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 
99.  At the time, economists proposed allowing budget deficits to exceed the 
3% limit and instead to focus on the “structural deficit” which is “based on 
spending policies unaffected by economic changes.”  Id.  Others suggest re-
moving budgetary restrictions and replacing them with “a commitment to 
keep official borrowing within agreed limits.”  Id.  Many economists had gone 
as far as to suggest that Europe would be better off without the pact and the 
sooner it is gone the better.  Rules for the Euro, supra note 67. 
 120. Graff, supra note 66. 
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supported the view that “rules that force countries to cut spend-
ing, even as their economies slow, are indeed stupid, if not posi-
tively dangerous.”121  The German author of the Pact, however, 
still touts the agreement as a good thing for the EMU.122  
Though the question whether the Pact has actually been harm-
ful or helpful to the EMU thus far still lingers, the far more im-
portant question is how much and what type of reform is 
needed to provide the EMU with a better tool for the future. 
IV. STANDARDS VS. RULES 
The existence of rules and standards within a legal system 
and the distinctions in the methods of jurisprudence that each 
provide has been the subject of debate by legal theorists for sev-
eral decades.123  The obvious difference in the employment of 
either rules or standards by a rule-making body is that rules 
  
 121. Reforming the EU’s Stability Pact?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 7247925. 
 122. Graff, supra note 66. Germany’s Finance Minister, Theo Waigel — 
often considered the godfather of the Stability Pact — who pushed for an 
agreement explicitly outlining deficit limits, retorts, “only because of [the 
Pact] has a culture of stability emerged in Europe.”  Id.  He believes that the 
Pact has forced European governments to pay strict attention to keeping their 
budgets balanced and without it the EMU would be much worse off.  Id. 
 123. Ronald Dworkin initially developed his “interpretive theory of law” in 
The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967), as an alternative to the the-
ory of legal positivism, a system of rules which H.L.A. Hart set forth in THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).  Though Hart’s positivism viewed law as consisting 
of only rules and, if no rule is available for a particular situation, judicial dis-
cretion, Dworkin’s response provided that the law really had both rules and 
more general principles (standards) at its disposal as dispute solving re-
sources.  Brian Bix asserts:  
[W]hile there are reasons to conclude that Dworkin had overstated 
the differences between his view of the law and that of H.L.A. Hart, 
and also that he made out the line between rules and principles to be 
clearer than it (sometimes) is in practice, what remains is the insight 
that a purely rule-based approach to the nature of law or the nature 
of judicial reasoning would be problematic.  
BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 8, 82 (2d ed. 1999); see also 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685 (1976).  Although the CLS analysis between rules and standards 
often questions the very existence of a distinction of the two forms, for pur-
poses of this paper, the discussion assumes that a viable distinction does exist.   
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are more specifically stated than standards.124  The difference in 
specificity between rules and standards effects the degree by 
which a decision-making body may employ its own discretion 
during the decision process.  In theory, a rule, which commonly 
represents an underlying policy,125 should eliminate the need for 
judicial discretion in the decision-making process.  Conversely, 
a standard allows the decision-making body to employ its own 
discretion in formulating its decision in order to achieve the 
underlying policies.  The use of either standards or rules by a 
legislative body can result in various legal outcomes depending 
on the amount of discretion the decision-making body is at lib-
erty to use.  
Removing the use of discretion from the decision-making 
equation eliminates the opportunity for politics or biases to 
creep into the process.  The absence of discretion also allows a 
greater level of predictability within the legal system.  How-
ever, the removal of discretion can tie the hands of a decision-
making body, leading to a result that is often over- or under-
inclusive.  Discretion can provide the judge with the latitude of 
applying the particular facts of a situation, thereby following 
the “spirit” of the standard and ensuring that justice is served.  
This section will explore these and other pros and cons of the 
varying levels of discretion which exist through the use of rules 
versus standards.   
A. Rules 
A rule is an attempt by a rule-making body to restate an un-
derlying policy in “concrete terms.”126  One accepted definition of 
a rule is as follows:  
  
 124. See THEODORE M. BENDITT, LAW AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE: PROBLEMS OF 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 74 (1978).  A common example of a rule is: “The maximum 
speed limit is 55 miles an hour,” whereas a standard is: “No one shall be per-
mitted to profit from his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong.”  
Id.  See also EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 486–88 (1994) (quoting 
Dworkin, supra note 123).  Another example of a standard is: “Drivers may 
travel ‘no faster than is reasonable.”  Russell B. Korobkin, Behavior Analysis 
and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000). 
 125. Although the terms principles and policies represent two distinct ideas, 
the difference is not pertinent to this paper; “policies” will be used to stand for 
the underlying motivations behind the promulgation of rules.   
 126. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 103 (2001); 
see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
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A legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker 
to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited 
triggering facts.  Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to 
facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value 
choices to be worked out elsewhere.  A rule captures the back-
ground principle or policy in a form that from then on operates 
independently.  A rule necessarily captures the background 
principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of over- 
or under-inclusiveness.  But the rule’s force as a rule is that 
decisionmakers follow it, even when direct application of the 
background principle or policy to the facts would produce a dif-
ferent result.127 
The attractiveness provided by the use of rules stems from 
their automatic nature,128 which allows for a high level of pre-
dictability.  A common example of a rule is contained in New 
York’s per se law addressing the socially undesirable behavior 
of driving while intoxicated.  In New York, a person is prohib-
ited from driving when that person’s blood consists of .10% of 
alcohol (or higher).129  As in the above stated definition, when a 
situation arises which calls for a legal determination based on a 
particular rule, a judge merely recognizes certain “triggering 
facts” — in this case a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) of .10% — 
and applies the appropriate rule for that particular situation in 
order to find the desired outcome.  In theory, there is no inser-
  
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 139 (1994) (“The most 
precise form of authoritative general direction may conveniently be called a 
rule, although this term is often used much more broadly to signify a legal 
proposition of any kind.”).  For purposes of this paper, the term “rule” will be 
used to connote a specific legal directive as opposed to a more “general” stan-
dard.  
 127. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 45; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992). 
 128. HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 139 (“In the narrow and techni-
cal sense in which the term is here used, a rule may be defined as a legal di-
rection which requires for its application nothing more than a determination 
of the happening or non-happening of physical or mental events — that is, 
determinations of fact.”); see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 15 (1987); ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 158 (“A rule is 
formal and mechanical.”). 
 129. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 1192(2) (1996) (“Driving while in-
toxicated; per se.  No person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person 
has .10 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood as 
shown by chemical analysis of such person’s blood, breath, urine or saliva.”). 
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tion by the judge of his own beliefs,130 and no risk of distortion of 
the rule or its background policies.131  There exists much pre-
dictability in such a process, since the judge need only analyze 
the facts, read the rule, and apply it.132   
This high level of predictability benefits parties and players 
throughout the legal process.  First, rulemakers have greater 
certainty that decisionmakers and members of society will con-
sistently interpret the rules which they promulgate thereby bet-
ter serving the policies of the society.133  Greater predictability 
results in a more consistent legal system.  Second, the use of 
rules affords decisionmakers the luxury of avoiding the political 
pressure and controversies that would otherwise arise from the 
voice of skeptics,134 since the simplicity and clarity of the rule’s 
application decreases the opportunity to second-guess the deci-
sionmaker.  Furthermore, although a particular outcome may 
not be the desired result of the judge’s constituents or serve his 
own political views, he will not be at liberty to impose his dis-
cretion beyond applying the particular rule to a set of facts.135  
He thereby avoids the temptation of serving interests other 
  
 130. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 58 (“Rules force decisionmakers to dismiss 
personal and political biases when deciding a matter thereby allowing the rule 
itself as applied to the facts to determine the outcome.”). 
 131. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 103 (“Rules work by restat-
ing moral principles in concrete terms, so as to reduce the uncertainty, error, 
and controversy that result when individuals follow their own unconstrained 
moral judgment.”). 
 132. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 62. Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan refers 
to this mechanical nature of rules which affords much predictability within 
the legal system as the “Fairness of Formal Equality.”  Id.  She goes on to say, 
“Rules reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias by preventing deci-
sionmakers from factoring the parties’ particular attractive or unattractive 
qualities into the decision-making calculus.”  Id. 
 133. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards, 42 DUKE L.J. 577, 588 (1992). 
 134. Whether or not it is a desired result to have decisionmakers totally 
unanswerable for the results of their decisions and to allow them to “wash 
their hands” of an outcome is mentioned further in this section.  One view on 
this matter is that the judge may be inclined to “throw her hands up” after 
applying a rule that does not necessarily promote the policies of the society in 
a particular instance because the judge may feel she has no recourse in seeing 
that justice is done.  Such an approach renders the judge virtually ineffective 
in promoting justice.  This often leads to over- or under-inclusiveness.   
 135. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486 (“If the rule is valid, and if the 
facts set forth by the rule arise, then the outcome presented by the rule must 
stand.”). 
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than the policies of society.  Lastly, members of society can fore-
see the repercussions of their actions as well as the outcome of a 
legal decision almost as easily as they can read the rule itself.  
Since members can easily determine what behavior is accept-
able and unacceptable they will begin to have more trust and 
reliance in their legal system.136  Moreover, the predictability of 
the rule affords them the opportunity to plan their activities 
accordingly which allows the society to become more progres-
sive.137  Thus, at first glance, the predictability made possible by 
the use of rules has several desirable results.   
There are, however, drawbacks to the use of rules.  The main 
problem with having a system of rules, which concerns most 
legal theorists, is the result of over- and under-inclusiveness.138  
The general nature of rules allows similar treatment of dissimi-
lar people or, conversely, dissimilar treatment of like cases.139  
The outcome that often arises is one that the rule–maker did 
not foresee or want.140  For example, a strict rule will sometimes 
  
 136. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 41 (“Rules [ ] are designated to permit little 
discretion; they ensure that people will perceive that they are treated uni-
formly.”). 
 137. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 25. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 220 (2001); Sullivan, supra note 127, at 123 
n.259 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term — Fore-
word: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10–11, 19–21 
(1984) (“If a party knows that judges will not intervene to save her after the 
consequences of her choices become apparent, she will plan more carefully and 
greater productivity will result.”)).  
 138. POSNER, supra note 137, at 220.  Over- and under-inclusiveness refers 
to the “imperfect fit between the rule and circumstances, resulting in some 
outcomes that are erroneous from the standpoint of the substantive principle 
undergirding the rule.”  Id.  KELMAN, supra note 128, at 40.  “Rules are bad 
because they are under-inclusive as to purpose, over-inclusive as to purpose, 
or both.”  See also Korobkin, supra note 124, at 36 (“[W]hatever the underly-
ing policy goal of the legal pronouncement, rules will often permit some unde-
sirable conduct and prohibit some desirable conduct.”); Bernard W. Bell, Dead 
Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, The Rules/Standards Dilemma and The 
Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189, 199 (1999). 
 139. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 62. See also Bell, supra note 138, at 200 
n.51. 
 140. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 15.  Alexander & Sherwin offer an example 
of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness that explains the problem well.  
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 103.  Say the rule, “No talking in 
the library,” is established in order to promote study.  The rule does not forbid 
leaf blowers in the courtyard no matter how much they disrupt studying in 
the library, because they are not “in the library.”  They are in the courtyard.  
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fail to stop behavior which the law aims to prevent, because one 
particular detail of a given situation is not contemplated by the 
rule.  Consider the rule of operating a motor vehicle while in-
toxicated.  Suppose a bicyclist is riding a bicycle on public roads 
with a BAC above .10%.  Such behavior can very well expose 
innocent people as well as the bicyclist to danger.  However, the 
behavior is not covered under the law dealing with motor vehi-
cles because a bicycle is man–powered.141  This detail will pre-
vent law enforcement officials from prohibiting the type of be-
havior, which contradicts the underlying policy behind the rule 
— keeping citizens free from danger on public roadways.  On 
the other hand, innocent persons may find that a rule does 
cover their behavior even though the underlying policy behind 
the rule does not target such behavior.  Conversely, consider 
someone who is driving faster than fifty-five miles per hour in 
order to get his wife who is in labor or his child who is seriously 
hurt to a hospital.  Although he is “speeding” as defined in the 
law, it is doubtful that the rulemakers intended to curtail such 
behavior — at least not to such an extreme extent.142     
There are other drawbacks to the use of rules.  First, in pro-
viding legal direction, rulemakers cannot realistically conceive 
every set of circumstances which require a rule.143  In a rule 
  
Nor does the rule allow three people, who are the only people in the library, to 
have an open study session within the library reading area.  They are still 
“talking in the library.”  Id. 
 141. The scenario is an example of dissimilar treatment of like cases.  Sulli-
van, supra note 127. 
 142. This is an example of similar treatment of dissimilar people. 
 143. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 36 (“[B]y their very nature, that is, be-
cause rules are specified ex ante, even complex rules will sometimes fail to 
take account of all factual variations that might arise ex post, which might be 
relevant to optimal tailoring of legal boundaries.”); Bell, supra note 138, at 
199 (“[R]ules either cover situations or people that do not pose the harm that 
the rule is intended to prevent, or they do not cover situations or people that 
the statute is intended to reach.”).  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 
(1961) (“Sometimes the sphere to be legally controlled is recognized from the 
start as one in which the features of individual cases will vary so much…,that 
uniform rules to be applied from case to case without further official direction 
cannot usefully be framed by the legislature in advance.”).  In fact, any prom-
ulgation of a successful rule is a considerable achievement for a legislature.  
See HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 139 (“When a legal proposition 
functions successfully as a rule without the necessity of further elaboration, [ ] 
some rather remarkable things have happened.  The [ ] situation bringing the 
rule into play has been accurately foreseen, and public policy with respect to it 
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based system, for every particular set of circumstances, a rule 
will either exist or it will not.144  If a rule does not exist, or it 
does not cover the particular circumstances close enough to ap-
ply a “cookie-cutter” answer, the judge must still come to a deci-
sion.145  This acknowledgement leads to the reality that a judge 
will invariably either “squeeze” a set of facts into a rule or use 
discretion to come to a decision, thereby leaving holes in the 
desired “mechanical” aspect of a system of rules.146  Second, the 
very fact that a judge may “wash [his] hands” of the results of 
applying a rule which a rule-making body has promulgated, 
without ever having contemplated the particular parties in 
question nor the accompanying set of facts, is an unsavory re-
sult in any sophisticated system of law.  The judge undoubtedly 
has the best perception of whether an act needs punishment 
and which parties are innocent despite the outcome prescribed 
by the rule.  A strict rule will often curtail the decision maker’s 
authority to see justice through.  Third, members of society who 
are knowledgeable of the law may promote their own interests 
by skirting the line on the side of what is in fact legal but not 
necessarily in the interests of society.147  Though not a violation 
of the rule, the results do not promote the “spirit” of the law.148  
Lastly, members who know and understand the law may also 
  
fully determined in advance.”).  Korobkin also makes the point that rulemak-
ers may not even possess the capacity to make highly effective rules.  Korob-
kin, supra, note 124, at 59 n.43 (citing Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision 
of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 97–98 (1983) (“Selecting the opti-
mally precise form for a given rule would seem to require qualities beyond the 
reach of many administrators: selfless concern for the public good, consistent 
goals, comprehensive vision, and accurate foresight.  Real policymakers, by 
contrast, are ordinary mortals burdened with incomplete knowledge, imper-
fect vision, and selfish desires.”)). 
 144. BENDITT, supra note 124, at 74. Rules act in an “all or nothing fashion.”  
Id. 
 145. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 44.   
 146. Id. (“Rules inevitably have gaps and conflicts.”). 
 147. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 59 n.37 (citing Kennedy, supra note 123, 
at 1773 (“Rules inform bad men exactly what they can get away with.”)); Bell, 
supra note 138, at 200 (“Precise rules allow evasion.”); see also KELMAN, supra 
note 128, at 41 (“Rules are bad because they enable a person to ‘walk the line,’ 
to use the rules to his own advantage, counterpurposely.”). 
 148. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 41 (“[U]njust outcomes will occur more 
often because people will actively attempt to arrange their affairs so that they 
are favored by the rules.”). 
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find it in their best interest to use their superior knowledge to 
take advantage of members who may not have either as high a 
level of understanding of the law and are therefore at a disad-
vantage in society.   
B. Standards 
A standard is a general directive that requires behavior in 
conformance with a society’s well-known principles or policies.  
A standard requires a decision-making body to determine 
whether an action conforms to the standard’s criteria.149  The 
following is one accepted definition of a standard: 
A legal directive is “standard”-like when it tends to collapse 
decision-making back into the direct application of the back-
ground principle or policy to a fact situation.  Standards allow 
for the decrease of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by 
giving the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules.  Stan-
dards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all rele-
vant factors or the totality of the circumstances.  Thus, the 
application of a standard in one case ties the decisionmaker’s 
hand in the next case less than does a rule — the more facts 
one may take into account, the more likely that some of them 
will be different the next time.150 
  
 149. Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997). 
 150. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 45; Sullivan, supra note 127, at 58.  
See also HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 139 (“A standard may be de-
fined broadly as a legal direction which can be applied only by making, in 
addition to a finding of what happened or is happening in the particular situa-
tion, a qualitative appraisal of those happenings in terms of their probable 
consequences, moral justification, or other aspect of general human experi-
ence.”).  Roscoe Pound calls attention to three characteristics of legal stan-
dards:  
1) They all involve a certain moral judgment upon conduct.  It is to be 
“fair,” or “conscientious,” or “reasonable,” or “prudent,” or “diligent.”   
2) They do not call for exact legal knowledge exactly applied, but for 
common sense about common things or trained intuition about things 
outside of everyone’s experience.   
3) They are not formulated absolutely and given an exact content, ei-
ther by legislation or by judicial decision, but are relative to times 
and places and circumstances and are to be applied with reference to 
the facts of the case in hand.  
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The use of standards, therefore, unlike a rule, allows a judge 
to use his or her discretion during the decision-making proc-
ess.151  The benefit is that the law no longer requires the judge to 
force a particular rule into a set of facts whether or not the out-
come is the desired result of the underlying policy.152  An exam-
ple of a standard is the New York law which prohibits people 
from driving “in an intoxicated condition.”153  Pursuant to this 
law, the judge may consider all of the relevant facts surround-
ing the situation in question (even beyond BAC) and make a 
determination according to the appropriate societal standard.154  
Due to this use of discretion, standards are much more flexible 
than rules155 allowing judges to treat like cases alike156 and con-
versely, no longer forcing similar treatment of dissimilar people.  
Advocates who view the use of discretion as an acceptable 
  
ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 118 (1922); 
Kennedy, supra note 123, at 1688 (providing examples of standards: good 
faith, due care, fairness, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and reason-
ableness). 
 151. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 66.  Professor Sullivan describes the proc-
ess as “Fairness as Substantive Justice.”  Id. 
 152. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486 (asserting that standards do not 
“set out legal consequences that follow automatically when the conditions 
provided are met.”); HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 140 (“Unlike a 
rule, the application of a standard requires [ ] more than a determination [of 
mere] events.  It requires a comparison of the quality or tendency of what 
happened in the particular instance with what is believed to be the quality or 
tendency of happenings in like situations.”).  The process to determine 
whether a driver has driven “no faster than is reasonable” entails the adjudi-
cator investigating “the range of relevant driving conditions and apply[ing] 
the background principle of reasonableness to the situation.”  Korobkin, supra 
note 124, at 23. 
 153. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 1192(3) (1996) (“Driving while in-
toxicated.  No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated 
condition.”). 
 154. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486 (“[A standard] states a reason that 
argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision. … [The] 
principle is one which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a 
consideration inclining in one direction or another.”).  See also BIX, supra note 
123, at 81; J.G. RIDDALL, JURISPRUDENCE 95 (1991). 
 155. BIX, supra note 123, at 81 (“In contrast to rules, [standards] do not act 
in an all-or-nothing fashion: that is, they can apply to a case without being 
dispositive.”);  ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 158 (proposing that 
standards “are flexible, context-sensitive legal norms that require evaluative 
judgments in their application”). 
 156. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 66. 
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method of judicial decision-making, see the application of stan-
dards as providing a greater opportunity to promote justice.157  
There are other benefits to the application of standards and 
the increased use of discretion.  First, the acceptance of judicial 
discretion and the flexibility that comes with it also allow the 
rule-making body to rely more on the ability of the decision-
making body to make just decisions.  This, in turn, relieves the 
rule-making body from the task of developing an intricate body 
of rules ex ante — before the behavior takes place — to fit 
countless sets of possible circumstances.158  The task of address-
ing the countless varying situations falls on the decision-
making body who must now interpret some common sense so-
cietal standard post ante — after the behavior takes place — 
and apply it to a particular set of facts.  Under the driving “in 
an intoxicated condition” standard, the decisionmaker may look 
toward imposing penalties against those drivers whose BAC 
was not above .10%, but nevertheless placed people’s lives in 
danger while operating a motor vehicle after drinking alcohol.159  
Second, standards provide the desired result of requiring a de-
cisionmaker to accept his responsibility and his decisions.160  
Standards negate the possibility of the decisionmaker “washing 
his hands” of the result because “there was nothing he could 
do.”  With standards, the decisionmaker faces much more pres-
sure to consider all the circumstances.  In short, standards “af-
  
 157. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 37 (“If standards are applied precisely, no 
desirable behavior will be sanctioned and no undesirable behavior will avoid 
sanction.”).  Of course, there is an underlying contradiction in the arguments 
for the use of a rule or standard when considering discretion.  Proponents of 
rules do not want discretion playing a role in the decision-making process.  
Proponents of discretion see it as a necessity in the process.  The discrepancy 
is resolved by understanding that the bias towards a rule or standard lies in 
whether the person believes discretion is a good thing or an evil thing. 
 158. HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 140 (“Even more obviously than 
the [ ] rule, the standard involves a postponement of decision until the matter 
can be judged from the perspective of the point of application.  Indeed, [it] 
avoids [ ] the imprisonment of general judgment in any precise verbal for-
mula.”). 
 159. The decisionmaker can promote a society’s underlying policies to the 
extent that the rulemakers originally intended.  In this case, the judge can 
provide safety to those people using public streets even though an intoxicated 
driver may not have exceeded the legal limit for BAC. 
 160. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 67. 
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firm rather than deny…[the] responsibility” of decisionmakers161 
to promote justice through their use of discretion. 
Although the use of standards and the addition of judicial 
discretion bring a decrease in predictability, such a situation 
may promote desired results in terms of members of society fol-
lowing a general policy itself.  People will not know the exact 
line between what is legal and what is illegal,162 due both to the 
addition of judicial discretion and the vague nature of standards 
themselves. 163  They will not be able to intentionally keep their 
actions narrowly within the confines of a rule in order to further 
their own interests.164  They will therefore have to act according 
to the intended purpose of the standard or risk acting in a 
manner which a judge may interpret as unacceptable under 
their society’s standards.  Also, people will no longer possess the 
tools to exploit the less informed.165  Everyone must act within 
the confines of the standard that their society deems appropri-
ate, instead of one party having the advantage of knowledge of 
a line clearly defined by law. 
However, the lack of clarity surrounding standards may, of 
course, lead to undesirable behavior.  Some people may fail to 
act in a cautious manner and stray too far into the gray area of 
the standard which leads to illegal behavior.166  Also, rulemak-
ers may find that persons who wish to conform to the standards 
of their society and behave in a legal manner may be unable to 
interpret exactly what those standards are.167  Unintentional 
  
 161. Id. (quoting Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term — 
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986)). 
 162. HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 140.  The meaning of standards 
such as “reckless,” “generally fair and equitable,” and “due care” depends upon 
the feeling for the particular type of situation of the individual standard–
applier.  Different appliers may apply them differently.  The standard thus 
represents a much looser form of control than the rule.  Id. 
 163. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 29.  Standards “contain 
vague or controversial moral or evaluative terms in their formulations.  Per-
sons attempting to conform to standards must be able to resolve for them-
selves the application of these vague or controversial moral and evaluative 
terms.”  Id. 
 164. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 26.  
 165. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 66. 
 166. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 37. 
 167. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 29 (“The standards do not 
improve their ability to determine what they need to determine.”); KELMAN, 
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illegal behavior would become a problem or legal behavior may 
be foreborn.168  As a result of the lack of clarity, people may also 
have less ability to plan their actions169 due to fear of breaking 
the law.  The lack of clarity would, in effect, force people to act 
in an overly cautious manner by curtailing their behavior170 
thereby stunting the growth of society.  Caused by a lack of 
clarity within the law, these are obviously not the desired re-
sults of an effective legal system.171 
Finally, the decrease in the clarity of the laws which embody 
the legal system can also result in a threat to the application of 
justice itself.172  With the decreased clarity of the law, judges 
would have a greater opportunity to inject their own biases or 
politics into the decision-making process.  The judge’s decisions 
may change on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to the judge’s 
whim173 through a manipulation of the law, thereby resulting in 
the dissimilar treatment of similar people.174  Furthermore, even 
if a judge’s own biases do not effect the decision-making process, 
the politics of the society may prove to be a compelling force 
  
supra note 128, at 43 (“Standards are bad because they give people no clear 
warning about the consequences of their behavior.”). 
 168. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 37; see also id. at 59 n.41 (citing Robert E. 
King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155, 
164–67 (1999) (“Montana’s ‘reasonable and prudent’ speeding law increased 
unreasonable and imprudent driving because of lack of clarity.”)).  If parties 
require a higher authority to interpret standards because they cannot resolve 
for themselves the applications of the moral principles that they subscribe to, 
then the parties will not be helped by these standards. ALEXANDER & 
SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 29. 
 169. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 43. 
 170. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 38; Sullivan, supra note 127, at 123 n.257 
(citing Bagett v. Billitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (“Those…sensitive to the 
perils posed by … indefinite language, avoid the risk…only by restricting their 
conduct to that which is unquestionably safe.”)). 
 171. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 33 (“If precisely drawn law encourages 
socially desirable behavior and discourages socially undesirable behavior.”). 
 172. POSNER, supra note 137, at 220 (“[Uncertainty] may invite judicial cor-
ruption, whether financial or political, by making it difficult for outsiders to 
determine whether a judicial decision is in accordance with the law.”); see also 
KELMAN, supra note 128, at 41 (“Standards are bad because they are subject 
to arbitrary and /or prejudicial enforcement.”). 
 173. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 38; see also KELMAN, supra note 128, at 62 
(discussing the fear of a judges whim, “A reliance on standards is premised on 
the hope of moral dialogue and ultimate consensus.”). 
 174. Bell, supra note 138, at 201. 
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upon the judge’s interpretation and application of the standard.  
Surmounting political pressure, either from those in power who 
put the judge on the bench or even from constituents, may force 
the judge to make a decision one way or another whether or not 
that choice is the just one.  In such a situation, whether or not 
discretion allows justice to prevail becomes a formidable ques-
tion.     
C. Theories Applying the Rules vs. Standards Debate 
1. Crystals and Mud 
Property law has always had a basis of clearly defined and 
well-known doctrines, or rules.175  However, these rules often 
find themselves transformed into less distinct rules, or even 
standards, through exceptions and other forms of judicial dis-
cretion.176  Therefore, just as is common in other areas of law, 
within property law at any given time we will find both rules 
and standards.  In her presentation of the structural and prac-
tical differences between rules and standards in property law 
Professor Carol M. Rose argues: 
rules (crystals) will better order arms-length transactions 
among players in the marketplace, whereas standards (mud) 
will better order transactions among players known to each 
other through repeat or customary interchange.  In other 
words, [the theory calls for] individualism (rules or crystals) 
for the market [and] altruism (standards or mud) for the mer-
cantile family or clan.177 
As stated above, the result of the differences between rules 
and standards is that the use of each of these legal directives 
becomes advantageous in markedly distinct scenarios.  Rules 
are better suited in a marketplace setting where parties do not 
deal with each other regularly and may not ever deal with each 
other again.  In that instance, the advantage is the availability 
  
 175. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
577 (1988). 
 176. Id. at 578.  In fact, it is a circular process which continues with legisla-
tures shoring up the now “muddied” rules with new more precise rules — and 
the process continues.  Id. 
 177. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 123 n.283 (discussing Rose, supra note 
175). 
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of clear guidelines that allow people to protect themselves from 
the trickery of others.  Standards are seen as a better fit in a 
family or clan-like group.  In such an organization, parties that 
deal with each other on a regular basis, thereby building rela-
tionships, can take advantage of more fluid guidelines by which 
to interact.  People develop a sense of whom they can trust, and 
therefore take business or social risks, and whom they cannot 
trust, and therefore either choose to not deal with the other 
party at all or deal under a heightened sense of cautiousness.  
2. Vices and Virtues  
Professor Pierre J. Schlag identifies what he refers to as 
“perhaps the most common understanding of the rules v. stan-
dards dialectic,” which are the virtues and vices that come with 
selecting either a rule or standard as a form of legal order.178   
When certainty, uniformity, stability, and security are required, 
rules are more prudent; when flexibility, individualization, 
open-endedness, and dynamism are important, standards are 
thought to be the more suitable choice.179  The determining fac-
tor when deciding whether to implement rules or standards be-
comes which of these competing virtues are most desirable for a 
particular circumstance.180 
Professor Schlag also lists the objectives that a legal directive 
can serve: deterrence, allocation, communication, delegation, 
and inducement.181  When attempting to promote these possible 
objectives by creating a particular law, however, the entity 
crafting the legal directive should not ignore competing objec-
tives which are often also desired.182  To state two, the compet-
ing objective of delegation is control; that of deterrence is em-
powerment.183  So, for example, when a legal directive is prom-
ulgated to promote delegation, the rule-making body must be 
mindful of not relinquishing all control, thereby foiling any 
sense of a hierarchal system.  Likewise, when a directive is 
  
 178. Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 
(1985). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 401. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 402. 
 183. Schlag, supra note 178, at 402. 
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promulgated to deter behavior, the rule-making body must also 
allow members of the society enough freedom to act, so that 
growth continues  and the society is not stifled. 
3. Costs 
a. Frequency of Occurrence 
The decision behind the promulgation of rules and standards 
also presents several economic questions.  Promulgating rules is 
often more costly ex ante than standards, whereas standards 
are more costly to apply ex post.184  Rules require information 
and discussion in order to determine what conduct is permissi-
ble.185  Standards require decisionmakers to undertake a deter-
mination of the legal issues as well as the facts.186  Thus, the 
decision to utilize rules or standards often depends on the re-
sources needed to effectuate each. 
Professor Lisa Kaplow asserts that the answer to the ques-
tion of whether to promulgate rules for a particular set of cir-
cumstances or to allow standards to provide the direction to a 
society and its legal decision-making body often lies in a deter-
mination of the frequency of the occurrence.187  When conduct is 
frequent, it is prudent to formulate a rule to provide direction 
on the acceptable kind of conduct.  The cost of the promulgating 
such a rule is justified since it will save resources in the long 
run due to the repetitiveness of the adjudicating process.188  
When conduct is infrequent, allowing a judge to apply a stan-
dard to an uncommon situation is often the more economic and 
therefore the more appropriate approach.  Society will apply 
fewer resources to those particular circumstances in the aggre-
  
 184. Kaplow, supra note 133, at 557. 
 185. Id. at 559; Korobkin, supra note 124, at 32. 
 186. Kaplow, supra note 133, at 559; Korobkin, supra note 124, at 32. 
 187. Kaplow, supra note 133, at 621 (“The central factor influencing the 
desirability of rules and standards is the frequency with which a law will gov-
ern conduct.”).   
 188. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 33 (“In such circumstances, the cost of 
matching a set of facts to a legal consequence is borne only once, when the 
rule is promulgated, and the cost is then amortized over a large number of 
transactions.”). 
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gate, 189 because devising the standard will require few resources 
and the infrequency of the conduct will ensure that the costs of 
applying the standard do not become excessive.  Once the rule-
making body decides whether the conduct in question occurs 
frequently, it can then decide to utilize a rule or rely on a stan-
dard.190 
b. Homogeneity and Behavior Deterred 
Closely related to the question of the frequency that a conflict 
will arise and the cost of promulgating legal directives is the 
characteristic of homogeneity.  When factual circumstances are 
homogeneous, rules tend to work well, because a single line de-
noting acceptable and unacceptable behavior addresses many 
situations well and will work in its intended manner more often 
than not.191  However, when events are heterogeneous with nu-
merous factors leading up to a particular behavior, rules will 
often have over- and under-inclusive results exposing the short-
comings and unfairness of a rigid legal system.192  Thus stan-
dards are often more appropriate when dealing with varying 
sets of circumstances, because a standard allows a decision-
maker to keep in mind many more factors when deciding a mat-
ter. 
V. THE RULES AND STANDARDS DEBATE APPLIED TO THE 
STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT 
As stated, the purpose of this Note is to offer some insight on 
the EMU by asking the question of which legal form, either rule 
or standard, would most likely provide a stable (and prosper-
  
 189. Id. (“Standards will be relatively desirable when a type of dispute 
arises infrequently, because the larger initial investment in rule promulgation 
will be amortized over fewer disputes, and, conversely case-by-case analysis of 
the problem will not result in an excessive duplication of effort.”). 
 190. Cost may not be the EU’s primary concern of whether to promulgate 
rules or standards.  It may not even be a concern of the EU at all.  However, 
like the analogy highlighting the differences of a mercantile and a clan, taking 
the frequency of an occurrence into consideration also provides helpful in-
sights for the EU relating to the implementation of rules and standards. 
 191. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 37. 
 192. Bell, supra note 138, at 226 n.47 (noting REED DICKERSON, THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 49–50 (1975) (“Universal 
enforcement of rigid rules can lead to anarchic and disruptive results.”)).  
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ous) future for the EMU.  The Stability and Growth Pact, the 
vehicle for the analysis of rules and standards, places several 
requirements on the subscribing Member States.  This Note will 
determine whether the provisions in our example, the Stability 
and Growth Pact, are rules or standards.  The Note will initially 
consider each legal directive individually; though, it will later 
concentrate on the most relevant provisions of the Pact in con-
tinuing the analysis of the pros and cons of each provision.  In 
considering the rules versus standards debate as applied to the 
Stability and Growth Pact this Note will offer conclusions as to 
which may better serve the goals of the EMU. 
A. The Stability and Growth Pact – Rule or Standard 
The section of the Pact describing the sanctions that the 
ECOFIN Counsel will impose is the Pact’s most standard-like 
section.  The sanctions require that the Member States make an 
initial non–interest bearing deposit of .2 to .5% of the country’s 
GDP.193  The Pact does not mention exactly what criteria the 
ECOFIN Council will use to determine whether a Member 
State will pay .2% or .5% or some variable in between.  Most 
likely, the Council will consider the severity of the violation 
(how far the Member States budget exceeds the 3% budgetary 
limit) and the surrounding circumstances of the violation in 
terms of the economic situation within the country.  This se-
quence of events exemplifies the definition of a standard in that 
the decisionmaker will be able to consider all applicable facts194 
when deciding the party’s fate. 
The central element of the Stability and Growth Pact gener-
ally requires members to keep their budgets “close to balance or 
in surplus.”  This wording allows for wide interpretation.  
Within the first three years of the Pact’s existence, the re-
quirement has been interpreted to mean that Member States 
should “avoid excessive budget deficit during a cyclical down-
turn.”  The directive seems standard–like in that it would avoid 
over- and under-inclusiveness by allowing more discretion than 
would a rule.195  In this case, European Commission should be 
  
 193. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8. 
 194. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486–88. 
 195. Id. 
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able to consider all applicable facts196 when considering a Mem-
ber State’s budgetary position.  However, the directive becomes 
more rule-like as one considers the requirements which under-
lie the “excessive budget deficit” standard.  In order for Member 
States to “avoid an excessive budget” they must keep their 
budget deficits below the 3% limit for a given year.  The limit 
has developed into a prerequisite for a members budget to be 
“close to balance or in surplus.”197  This strictly interpreted limit 
leads to the conclusion that the directive is actually more rule–
like upon its application. 
Council Regulation 1466/97 dealing with the surveillance of 
the budgetary positions and the economic policies198 of Member 
States is most certainly rule-like in its nature.  A legal directive 
is rule-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond to a case 
in a determinate way due to the presence of surrounding trig-
gering facts.199  This Regulation is a rule in that it carefully de-
lineates the requirements for submitting each member’s stabil-
ity program.  As stated previously, the Regulation outlines the 
rules concerning the content, submission, examination, and 
monitoring of those programs.200  The Regulation leaves little 
question to how a Member State must report its financial per-
formance and plans and what should be included in them.  If 
Member States do not follow the prescribed method of report-
ing, the ECOFIN Counsel could easily find a violation by 
quickly referring to these rules. 
Council Regulation 1467/97 concerning the speed and clarifi-
cation of the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure 
is also rule-like in nature.  As previously mentioned, the regula-
tion provides a clear method for prompt corrective actions by 
the ECOFIN Council within a carefully pre-determined timeta-
ble.201  The regulation outlines the times by which the Council 
must submit recommendations to a Member State as well as 
periods by which the Member State’s government must act 
upon those recommendations.  Again, should the Member State 
not follow the recommendations by the Council in a sufficient or 
  
 196. Id. 
 197. Frandsen, supra note 39.  
 198. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 31–32. 
 199. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486–88. 
 200. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32. 
 201. Id. 
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timely manner, the violation will easily reveal itself against the 
backdrop of these clearly defined rules.   
B. Should the Pact Consist of Rules or Standards? 
For purposes of the analysis on whether standards or rules 
are more suitable to the EMU, this Note will concentrate on the 
more substantive requirements of the Stability and Growth 
Pact concerning the deficit limit provision (a rule) and the sanc-
tioning provision (a standard).202  These provisions deal with a 
Member State’s financial performance under the Pact and the 
Council’s required response, respectively.  
1. Keeping Budget Deficits Close to Balance 
As mentioned previously, Professor Goebel has identified the 
objective of the Pact as deterrence.203  As shown by applying Pro-
fessor Schlag’s “vices and virtues” theory to Professor Goebel’s 
view, if the “virtue” of deterrence is the goal, legislatures should 
act cautiously in order to sufficiently provide members of their 
society with the freedom to continue to act productively.  Legis-
latures should not stop socially or economically desirable con-
duct.  While they must not deter certain conduct, they must do 
so in a way that empowers the parties within their domain to 
perform other desired conduct.  
The Pact will surely deter Member States from allowing 
budget deficits from growing excessively.  The reason for keep-
ing budget deficits lower is to bring stability and credibility to 
the newly introduced euro.204  To the prudent mind, rules seem 
to be the answer for a legal system which requires certainty, 
stability, and security.  Rules provide the clarity needed for sta-
  
 202. The two regulations supporting the Council Resolution outlining the 
budgetary limits are more procedural than substantive in nature in that they 
outline the reporting requirements of the Member State and the time con-
straints of both the ECOFIN Council and the Member States.  They provide 
the European Commission and the ECOFIN Council great oversight as to a 
country’s financial performance.  They also provide clear and executable goals 
both for the Member States in relation to the reporting process under the Pact 
as well as for the Council in proposing corrections in case of a violation.  Thus, 
although procedural in nature, the regulations are surely important in regard 
to the Pact’s effectiveness and overall success. 
 203. Goebel, supra note 42, at *4. 
 204. Mundell, supra note 1. 
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bility, which is undoubtedly a large (likely the underlying) rea-
son why the EU decided to promulgate such clear rules for the 
Pact.205 
However, the EU will most certainly have to take other fac-
tors into consideration.  This is a European Monetary “Union,” 
which now consists of twelve different nations with twelve very 
different economies, cultures and governments.206  According to 
Professor Schlag, the EU should allow for some degree of flexi-
bility and individualization so that the economies of the Mem-
ber States and the European economy do not stagnate while 
boasting the euro.  Therefore, open-endedness and dynamism 
should also play a part in the EMU’s legal order.  While keeping 
the euro stable by deterring excessive deficits, the Pact should 
also provide for empowerment in order to allow the govern-
ments to accept some level of risk and the ability to maneuver 
within their economies in order to spur growth.207 
According to the current limit on budget deficits under the 
Pact, Member States will most likely try to keep their deficits 
well below 3% in order not to receive a warning from the 
ECOFIN Counsel as Germany did early this year when its 
budget deficit was at 2.7%.208  But this type of deterrence, in 
fact, may stifle economies when they have opportunities to grow 
or further hinder them when they have come upon times of re-
cession as we see occurring in Germany today.  If this is the 
effect that the Pact has, it is lacking the type of empowerment 
Professor Schlag calls for in his analysis.209  The EU could grant 
  
 205. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 31. 
 206. Christopher Rhoads, EU Panel’s Solbes Says Fines Won’t Be Automatic 
For Breaking 3% GDP Rule, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jul. 25, 2003, available at 2003 
WL-WSJE 59766557.  GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 1 (“On January 1, 2001, 
Greece joined this group after meeting the Maastricht ‘convergence criteria.’”). 
 207. Schlag, supra note 178, at 402. 
 208. Sesit, supra note 91. 
 209. However, the costs in question deal with whether or not the deterring 
of behavior by an over-inclusive rule will be a great loss to society.  There may 
always exist the situation where deterrence of certain behavior is not a dire 
consequence.  See Sullivan, supra note 127, at 63 (“A utilitarian argument for 
rules reflects the judgment that the gains they elicit from the ‘industrious and 
rational’ will exceed the losses from the antisocial exploitation of bright 
lines.”); Kennedy, supra note 123, at 1689 (“If we adopt a rule, it is because of 
a judgment that this kind of arbitrariness is less serious than the arbitrari-
ness and uncertainty that would result from empowering the official to apply 
the standard of “free will” directly to the facts of each case.”). 
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the Member States of the EMU the empowerment needed to 
run their complex economies by either promulgating a less 
strict rule (for example, a 4 or 5 percent budget deficit ceiling) 
or possibly a “reasonableness”210 standard. 
Professor Rose’s “crystals and mud” analysis of rules and 
standards seems to lead the EU down a similar path towards 
more standard-like directives.  Rose asserts that rules are more 
suited to a market setting where parties do not deal with each 
other regularly, while standards are a better fit in a family or 
clan-like group where parties do deal with each other on a regu-
lar basis.211  There are obviously differences between property 
law, to which Professor Rose applied the rules vs. standards 
debate, and international monetary law, which governs the 
EMU.  However, recognizing the different dynamics, which ex-
ist within the “marketplace” and the “clan,” as presented by 
Professor Rose, poses interesting insights into the analysis of 
the EU and its Pact.  To say that the Members States of EU 
have had differences in the past is an understatement; however, 
the Members are undoubtedly not “strangers” in any sense of 
the word.  To the contrary, they more closely represent mem-
bers of a “mercantile family” or “clan,” and the EU (once re-
ferred to as the European “Community”) surely embodies the 
“customary” interchange, which exists within such entities — 
especially on an economic level.  The purpose behind forming 
the EU was to create a customs union where barriers to trade 
where eliminated thus producing a region where cross-border 
trade is commonplace.212  Though there have been political dif-
ferences the nations which make up the EU and people who live 
within those nations deal with their continental neighbors on a 
regular basis (be it for business or social purposes) and have 
done so for centuries.  Due to the effect of globalization on the 
world economy, if the EU desires to continue to have a leader-
ship role on the global stage, its members must continue to turn 
to each other and provide market share and other financial 
  
 210. Pound, supra note 150. 
 211. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 123 n.283. 
 212. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A GUIDE FOR AMERICANS ch. 1 (2002), at 
http://www.eurunion.org/infores/euguide/euguide.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 
2003) [hereinafter GUIDE]. 
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support to their neighbors.213  This reliance on each other is a 
fact of the EU’s existence today, and it is unlikely to change in 
the near or distant future.   
The fact that the European continent is a region built inher-
ently on international relationships, which the formation of the 
EU has strengthened, leads to an additional point under Pro-
fessor Rose’s theory.  Of course a Member State may, in fair 
dealing, try to get the “best deal” for itself from these “family” 
type circumstances.  However, in drawing an analogy to a mar-
ketplace setting, it is unlikely that one nation will intentionally 
“scheme” to break an EU treatise and run away with the “loot,” 
as the situation may occur in a marketplace.  Rather, due to 
proximity and practicality the Member State will have to re-
main within the “family” of states and most likely make repara-
tions to the other members for its violations.  The most likely 
scenario is that a Member State would not risk alienation from 
its neighboring states by deliberately or even negligently break-
ing an EU law, because the next day, that Member State would 
still have to turn to its fellow members for the same market 
share and financial support.  The risk of alienation from its 
neighbors is great and likely to pose serious consequences to 
consider before undertaking such actions.  Therefore, Member 
States, as part of a larger economic family, should not need the 
added protection that rules afford.       
  
 213. Although the goal of the Pact is to promote economic stability within 
the region (as well as to bring stability to the euro) the ultimate goal is to 
achieve prominence on the world economic stage.  The EU wants the euro to 
become an international currency.  Europeans want foreign investors to invest 
in their countries.  Of course, such interchanges can no longer be likened to a 
“family” relationship.  The continuance and growth of the euro by foreigners 
as well as foreign investment within the EU surely represent more closely the 
situation present in a marketplace setting where parties are dealing at arms-
length with each other, possibly never to deal with each other again (at least 
for a long time).  Such a scenario seems to call for the use of rules in order to 
ensure fair dealing on both sides of the transaction.  Nevertheless, the situa-
tion does not affect the interaction between the members of the EU.  The 
World Trade Organization promulgates international trade laws to be fol-
lowed by its members in order to promote fair dealing.  However, the EU still 
has the responsibility of prescribing laws within its borders in order to regu-
late the economic performance of its own Member States, and in so doing, it 
has the luxury of implementing standards due to their interdependent rela-
tions with each other.   
File: PaulMacro.doc Created on: 10/19/2003 8:42 PM Last Printed: 11/22/2003 12:11 PM 
2003] ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 447 
Under Professor Rose’s description of the “crystals and mud” 
theory, it seems that the best form of legislation for such a 
close-knit organization is the standard.214  A mud, or a stan-
dards-based regime takes into consideration ongoing interaction 
between parties over time (as is present in the EU) more than a 
rules-based regime.  Crystals or rules as the medium for contact 
between strangers are “hardhearted and mean spirited [in that] 
they glorify the attitude of self-centeredness and ‘me first.’ “215  
To the contrary, Member States must work together over time 
in order to complement and assist one another in building each 
other’s economies.  While one nation is in recession another 
may be in a state of inflation.  In another three or four years, 
the tide may turn and the Members may find themselves on the 
opposite side of the scale looking at the very problems that its 
neighbor had just faced.  The situation should allow Member 
States greater ability to deal with each other’s shortcomings 
together. 
The imprudence of initially attempting to devise a rule ex 
ante for eleven (or more) nations with different and changing 
economies offers further support for the use of standards in the 
EMU.  A rule promulgated ex ante would lead to less coopera-
tive dialogue between nations, more finger pointing, as well as 
more nations looking out for themselves.216  Considering that the 
very point of establishing the EU was to foster a climate of co-
operation, it is evident that finger pointing is not the goal of the 
Pact.  A “reasonable budget deficit” in light of a Member State’s 
economic situation may have been a more manageable solution 
and, in fact, a solution tailored more to an organization whose 
members rely so heavily on each other.  Thus, Member State’s 
lasting relationships and future common goals could allow them 
to follow a standards-based regime without getting into a spit-
ting contest.  In fact, a standard-like directive may promote 
  
 214. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 16 (“The rule form is said to express the 
substantive ideals of those committed to self–reliance and individualism…. 
The willingness to resort to the standard form is said to correspond to the 
embrace of substantive altruism.”).  
 215. Rose, supra note 175, at 605. 
 216. Id. at 607 (“To adopt a rhetoric of crystal rules, then, seems to be a way 
of denying the necessary dialog character of human interactions and acting as 
if we can compel human behavior by a perfect specification of unchanging 
rights and obligations.”). 
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even greater cooperation between Member States as an out-
growth of the need to work together and understand each oth-
ers’ economic circumstances — or else risk failure.217  As contin-
ued application of standards often leads to clearly defined direc-
tives, the EU could eventually set more stringent rules that are 
proven suitable to its Members’ needs once the ECOFIN Coun-
sel and the Member States have tested the viability of the sta-
bility programs and the standards underlying the Pact.  There-
fore, the crystals and mud theory lends to the idea that the EU 
should have relied more heavily on standards for the substan-
tive parts of the Pact. 
However, looking at the situation through a costs and fre-
quency analysis leads to quite contrary views.  As long as the 
Stability and Growth Pact aims to regulate the Member States 
within the EMU, the task of balancing budgets will always be a 
concern of nations within the EU.  Moreover, as long as the 
EMU is a functioning institution, the ECOFIN Counsel will 
continuously be evaluating at least twelve stability programs 
(and three convergence programs for the non-participating EU 
countries).  The rule approach will allow the Counsel to evalu-
ate each Member State each year without having to establish 
new law each time a unique situation arises.  It must merely 
monitor the budgets in order to determine whether or not a na-
tion has kept its budget close to balance and begin the sanction-
ing process when the facts tell them otherwise.218  In this regard 
the EU was correct in promulgating the Pact as a specifically 
delineated rule.   
When considering the costs of promulgating a rule or a stan-
dard, however, the EU should also have taken into account the 
homogeneity factor, as well as the differences of the nations 
comprising the EMU.  The EU has already witnessed several of 
its Members States flirting with violations of the 3% budget 
deficit limit and there will undoubtedly be more.  For example, 
Portugal has already broken the 3% budget deficit limit and 
Germany is coming dangerously close to doing the same.  With 
so many different business practices and economic systems 
  
 217. See KELMAN, supra note 128, at 62 (“A reliance on standards is prem-
ised on the hope of moral dialogue and ultimate consensus.”). 
 218. Furthermore, they can do all of this without allowing politics or na-
tional biases to interfere with the evaluation process. 
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within the EMU, the chances are low that even two states 
which break the deficit limit will do so for exactly the same rea-
sons.  Thus, taking the complex factors of politics, culture, and 
even economics into account the Member States of the EMU are 
indeed not homogeneous.  Some of these nations which fail to 
keep their budget deficits below 3% GDP may surely deserve to 
pay sanctions for frivolous spending and relying on their 
neighbors, while other Members may not deserve to pay sanc-
tions upon consideration of their underlying economic circum-
stances.  This rule–like provision may very well call for the im-
position of sanctions in an over-inclusive and undeserved man-
ner.  
This point leads us to some of the basic reasons behind em-
ploying a rule or standard, which the EU most likely considered 
as well.  First, as the budget deficit provision of the Pact is a 
rule, it is also predictable.  As we have seen with Portugal and 
Germany, the European Commission can easily determine 
when a Member State is not abiding by the pact and not keep-
ing its budget close to balance because their deficits are close to 
3% GDP.  When Portugal and Germany received their initial 
warnings about their budgetary performance, there was little 
talk about politics or biases from the ECOFIN Counsel.  As it 
stands, the Pact leaves little room for politics or biases.  Lastly, 
since the two nations knew that they had exceeded the budget-
ary limits, they could not be surprised about receiving the 
warnings.  Moreover, Portugal and Germany have not been able 
to keep their deficits below 3% GDP, but other Member States, 
knowing exactly what the limit is, have been able to keep their 
budgets low by planning accordingly.   
As long as Member States plan to (and do) keep their budgets 
well below the 3% ceiling, the rule will seem effective.  How-
ever, when members begin breaching the 3% ceiling, which is 
the present state of affairs, the Pact virtually ties the hands of 
the European Commission and the ECOFIN Counsel, for it 
leaves little discretion to its decisionmakers.  The two bodies 
will not have the liberty to look into the underlying circum-
stances in order to determine the reasons for the spending.  
Once the Member State has breached the 3% ceiling, the Com-
mission and the Counsel will have to abide by the process pre-
scribed by the Pact and require the nation to pay sanctions or 
render the Pact insignificant.  The preciseness of the rule may 
also lead to less than desirable behavior on the part of the 
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members of the EMU.  Member States may begin to “plan” to 
keep their budgets below 3% limit — just not so far below the 
limit.  If many members begin to flirt with the 3% ceiling simul-
taneously, the consequences could prove drastic for the EMU.  
Nations may begin to feel that a warning is harmless as long as 
they do not venture into the realm where sanctions are im-
posed.  Conversely, a nation that is struggling to keep its econ-
omy afloat will find that a mere warning is of small conse-
quences.  If a nation is struggling and on the verge of a major 
recession, the nation’s political and economic leader will have to 
make a choice between allowing their economy to slide further 
into recession or complying with the Pact and facing large sanc-
tions.     
Requiring Member States to abide by a standard such as 
“reasonable budget deficit” would help to avoid this situation.  
The Commission and Counsel would be able to look at the na-
tion’s stability program and use discretion to determine 
whether the problem emerged through the lack of frugality 
within the nation’s decisionmakers or through unavoidable eco-
nomic cycles.  The EU could avoid over- and under-
inclusiveness much more readily.  The two bodies would no 
longer have to allow the “similar treatment of dissimilar [na-
tions].”219  Furthermore, there would be no clear line for Member 
States to skirt.  Member States would have to act within the 
“spirit” of the Pact.  Nations would not have to keep their budg-
ets “close to balance” merely by keeping their deficits below 3% 
GDP.  The Commission and Counsel would have the tools and 
the authority to determine whether a nation is clearly abusing 
its right to keep a deficit when that nation has no dire need to 
keep a deficit, whether or not the nation is below the 3% limit. 
The lack of a definitive interpretation of the Pact, however, 
could very well lead to the problems of uncertainty described in 
Part IV.  Nations could delve into the gray area of what is a 
“reasonable budget deficit” and try to show that they do in fact 
have a reasonable deficit given their country’s circumstances.  
Such a situation could lead to a heated dialogue between Mem-
ber States and the EU possibly causing ever increasing political 
consequences.  Other members, without clearer guidance, would 
loose the ability to make sufficient economic plans for the fu-
  
 219. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 62. 
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ture.  Nations would tend to be even more cautious with their 
budgets than they would have with a clearly defined deficit ceil-
ing.  This would stunt productivity and harm the economy.  
Lastly, the European Commission and the ECOFIN Counsel 
may also begin making decisions based on political pressure or 
personal biases.   
Obviously, the pros and cons of using standards or rules are 
extremely intertwined and difficult to divide.  Perhaps the best 
way to answer the rules or standards question is to consider 
some of the recent developments of the Pact.  Given that the 
Pact is already three years old and has been through several of 
its own cycles of “ups” and “downs,” the luxury of hindsight ex-
ists.  On September 9, 2002, the German government stated 
that its country would honor its budgetary promises and comply 
with the Pact.220  At the same time, the French Prime Minister 
claimed that there was growth in his country’s economy which 
would allow the government to keep its deficit below the 3% 
limit.221  If these promises had become reality, even in the face of 
hard economic times and surmounting political pressure, praise 
would have fallen upon the authors of the Pact for their fore-
sight and conviction in sticking by their rule.  In his book, A 
Guide to Critical Legal Studies,222 Professor Mark Kelman as-
serts a point that is of particular interest in light of those recent 
budgetary promises by members of the EMU.  In a section ti-
tled, “General Arguments for Rules and for Standards,” Profes-
sor Kelman states that if legislatures promulgate rules in order 
to promote a certain type of behavior (or to deter another type of 
behavior), members of society will eventually conform to the 
rule and act in the prescribed manner.  In this situation, rules, 
as Professor Kelman expresses, are “dynamically stabilizing.”223  
Members may initially “toe the line” set by the rule or even vio-
  
 220. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99. 
 221. Juston Jones, France Issues Warning on Growth, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 
2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3405489. 
 222. KELMAN, supra note 128. 
 223. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 44 (“If decision makers are willing to put 
up with disquieting results in particular cases, people will gradually learn to 
comply with the rules.”).  Professor Kelman also reveals that some consider 
rules “dynamically destabilizing” when people begin to “walk the line” and 
when the rules grow to accommodate exceptions.  Id.  In these instances, rules 
fail to promote a society’s policies, either because they are so clear, or because 
they become difficult to interpret.  Id. 
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late the rule to see how serious the rule will be enforced and 
interpreted.  In this instance the theory is based on how firmly 
the factions interpreting and enforcing the rule stand.  Once the 
legislature promulgates the rule, even an austere rule, if the 
rule is both enforced and interpreted strictly, in time, the mem-
bers of the society will follow the rule.224  In turn, people will 
learn to comply with the rules rather than break the law,225 
thereby eventually achieving the policy makers’ intended result.  
If the EU stands by the Pact and its Members subsequently 
abide by its strict provisions Professor Kelman’s theory will cer-
tainly prove to be a formula for success — at least with the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact.226 
However, the promises that the Members States make and 
whether they can perform according to those promises are en-
tirely different.  In fact, when Germany made its pronounce-
ment that its deficit was 3.5%, analysts argued that it was im-
probable that Germany could bounce back from its recent eco-
nomic downturn and recover enough to ensure that its budget 
deficit would remain above 3% GDP for the year.227  Moreover, 
on September 25, 2002, the European Commission announced 
that it would allow the EU’s 15 Member States until 2006 to 
bring their budgets closer to balance.228  The decision came as a 
result of the likelihood that France, Germany, Italy, and Portu-
gal will each not meet their budget-deficit commitments as 
promised.229   
Despite the empty promises of the Member States, their in-
ability to meet the requirements of the Pact clearly shows that 
the initial rule lacked the flexibility required for the complexity 
of the EU’s goal and the diversity of the EU itself.  First, if a 
rule-making body finds itself needing to promulgate another 
new rule because the initial rule was not sufficient, the situa-
  
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. It is unlikely that every country in the EMU will have a balanced 
budget despite the recent economic forecasts.  However, eight out of the eleven 
are sure to have a balanced budget which shows that the provisions are realis-
tic and can be followed. Oyama, Commission to Extend Target, supra note 107. 
 227. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99 (“To assume that the economy will 
improve enough in the second half to bring the deficit in line is unrealistic.”). 
 228. James, supra note 72; Oyama, Commission to Extend Target, supra 
note 107. 
 229. Id. 
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tion negates any cost benefit and efficiency reasons that the 
rule-making body relied upon when it decided what type of di-
rective to promulgate in the first place.  Second, the benefits of 
predictability, avoidance of political pressure, and the ability to 
plan are also curtailed.  Although the decision to establish a 
new date to achieve a balance budget seemed necessary in order 
to help several members of the EMU, it is not difficult to see 
why the other Member States who have been able to abide by 
their plans to keep their budget deficits below 3% GDP and 
meet the initial balanced budget date in 2004 are wondering 
why they were working so hard to comply with this agree-
ment.230  Those countries which remain in compliance are un-
derstandably upset, which means that not only will the situa-
tion lead to questions about the “stability” of the EMU, but it 
will cause internal political conflict as well.  Still, the main 
point to be taken could simply be that the EU should not have 
tried to promulgate a strict rule to undertake such a new and 
enormous venture.231 
2. Imposing Sanctions 
Lastly, the fact that the EU imported more flexibility into the 
provision of the Stability and Growth Pact dealing with sanc-
tions, shows that it recognized the need to establish a standard-
like directive for such an unpredictable situation.  Of course, 
any possibility of sanctions which a Member State may have to 
sustain will prove to be a substantial burden especially to a na-
tion who is hurt economically.  However, the flexibility provided 
by the 2%–5% range of the sanction provision, can remove some 
of the sting caused by the harshness of an inflexible rule.232  As 
stated earlier, factors which allow the ECOFIN Counsel to de-
  
 230. Graff, supra note 66. Finance Ministers from those countries “that 
have crimped and clawed to get their budgets in line” were not pleased to put 
it politely.  Id. 
 231. Reforming the EU’s Stability Pact?, supra note 121. 
The fact is [ ] that there never has been a currency union between 
sovereign nations on this scale before, so no one can be certain what 
kind of fiscal rules will work best. ‘Learning by doing’ is an excellent 
idea in a kindergarten.  But it is a slightly alarming was of running 
the European economy. 
Id. 
 232. Though it may not be enough flexibility. 
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termine the severity of the violation will most likely weigh in 
the final decision of how large to make the sanctions.  Like a 
judge who is sentencing a defendant, the Counsel will undoubt-
edly consider many factors when applying the punishment.  The 
standard allows those sanctions to be levied in a measured de-
gree and affords the EU the latitude to deal with the economic 
differences between member states.  As the provision is a stan-
dard-like directive, promulgated to deal with numerous situa-
tions, it should prove to be an effective provision of the Pact in 
deterring large deficits.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the main priority of the EU in employing the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact is the stability of the euro.  As rules are 
often necessary to provide government interests their proper 
force, the EU may have been correct to utilize rules to seek 
their objectives. With the use of standards and more fact-
specific decisions, the likelihood increases that the decision-
maker would have found (possibly valid) sympathetic reasons 
for growing deficits that outweigh the EU’s long-term interests, 
thereby creating political pressures.  The EU surely considered 
these very implications when formulating the rule-like provi-
sions of the Pact.  However, the reality is that a diverse group of 
nations is trying for the first time to conduct its economic af-
fairs under one currency and one economy after several hun-
dreds of years of acting under separate currencies and econo-
mies.  Although a rule may have seemed to be the correct solu-
tion when considering the desired result, the underlying cir-
cumstances in the case of the EMU may not allow for the suc-
cessful implementation of such a “rule.” 
Paul de Grauwe, an economics professor and prior candidate 
to join European Central Bank, has long held that “a rigid sys-
tem of target numbers was a poor way to guide budgetary pol-
icy.”233  Some economists have proposed that the EU allow its 
members to exceed the 3% deficit when the economic situation 
  
 233. Graff, supra note 66.  Mr. de Grauwe had been quoted as asking, “Why 
should people believe that 3% is some magic number?...No other country has 
such a rule.”  Id.  De Grauwe also sums up the present effect of the Pact in 
that although it is a defensive mechanism meant to guard against inflations, 
it is a dangerous tool in time of deflation.  Id. 
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in their countries calls for such measures by the government.234  
These economists suggest that the EU focus instead on the 
“structural deficit, which is based on spending policies unaf-
fected by economic changes.”235  That way, the ECOFIN Counsel 
can judge the Member State based on the prudence of a gov-
ernment’s management of its economy and not on the economic 
situation which the government finds itself.  Others have pro-
posed raising the deficit limit from 3 to 5% GDP.236  Still others 
have gone as far as to say the EU should eliminate the deficit 
limit and replace it with a “commitment to keep official borrow-
ing within agreed limits.”237  The answer to whether or not the 
EU decides to transform the Pact into a more flexible standard-
based law238 lies a few years away, because the EU cannot 
amend the Pact until 2005.239  Abandoning the rules now would 
only risk international mockery.240    
In promulgating the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU may 
have given too much weight to the opinion of its international 
partners.  The concern was that if the Pact was too flexible, the 
world would take neither the EMU nor the euro seriously.  The 
EU may have been looking more outwardly than it should have, 
when its initial focus should have been to devise an internal 
solution.  The EU should not have worried about the world’s 
initial opinion of the euro and of the Pact.  No other entity co-
erced the EU into this undertaking.  The Member States them-
selves chose to form the EMU.  The EU flourished due to the 
success of open trading.  However, the EU as a whole knew its 
only recourse to remain relevant in the global marketplace was 
for its members to turn again to each other in order to form an 
  
 234. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Reforming the EU’s Stability Pact?, supra note 121. 
 237. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99. 
 238. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74 (“At the very least, the stability 
pact should be redefined in terms of the fiscal balance adjusted over the eco-
nomic cycle.  That would give governments more room to respond to a 
slump.”). 
 239. Restoring Europe’s Smile, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2002, available at 
2002 WL 7247929 (“Europe will rub along with the pact and semi-comply , 
destroying many jobs, albeit not as many as strict obedience would destroy.”). 
 240. Id. 
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ever tighter economic relationship.241  In doing so, the members 
should have based their goal of establishing a new currency on 
that relationship, while recognizing their differences to devise a 
standard-based regime which could deal with those differences 
while effectively stabilizing the euro.   Instead, it seems the EU 
was attempting to back itself into a good situation.  It was try-
ing to capture the world’s confidence in the EMU and the euro 
by promulgating a strict Pact.242   It should have devised a more 
workable standard that would have ensured the continued eco-
nomic stability of the region while the Member States worked 
together in order to achieve that stability.243  Such a result 
would have undoubtedly captured the world’s confidence.  
Still, the root cause behind the strictness of the Pact and the 
fear of instability was the ongoing distrust that the members of 
the EU have for each other and their inability to lay their dif-
ferences aside.244  It is ironic that the Pact is, itself, supposed to 
be a “political totem.”245  It aims to show the rest of the world 
that the nations of the EMU will not cheat on one another.246  
The result, however, has lead to what the EU has been trying to 
avoid all along — a mockery.  This group of nations mutually 
and amicably decided to form an economic union to preserve 
and promote their own economic future.  That some Member 
States which fought so hard for a tighter union would not trust 
their neighbors (as well as the EU’s own abilities to govern) 
enough to allow a standard-based regime to compensate for ob-
  
 241. That relationship thus far has been an economic relationship.  How-
ever, even the initial motive behind creating an economic relationship and 
therefore interdependence in Europe developed shortly after World War II to 
prevent war between European nations.  Looking towards the future, the lim-
its (or possibilities) for further political unification within the EU lie only in 
the present ambitions of each Member States representatives.  “A common 
foreign policy… is a cherished goal.”  Id. 
 242. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74 (“The central charge increas-
ingly made against the euro and all its works is that the institutions and pol-
icy instruments agreed upon in Maastricht a decade ago were all intended to 
bear down upon an inflationary threat that no longer exists.”). 
 243. Though the use of standards would generally lead to some degree of 
uncertainty, this does not necessarily mean that a lack of stability will inevi-
tably follow. 
 244. Reforming the EU’s Stability Pact?, supra note 121.  
 245. Id. 
 246. Id.  
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vious and unavoidable economic differences is itself a puzzling 
notion.   
In short, in devising the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU 
should have relied on its own ability to perform as a “Union” 
instead of promulgating a rule in order to force its members to 
conform with the requirements of the EMU.  The differences 
between the Member States, which comprise the EMU, make it 
difficult to devise one rule that will suit eleven or more nations.  
Of course the rules and standards debate will lead a legal theo-
rist (and maybe an economic strategist) down many paths that 
will arguably provide a similar number of pros and cons for 
each side.  Furthermore, competing theories discussing the 
rules and standards debate, from the standpoint of costs to the 
standpoint of deterrence, lead to varying results.  However, the 
fact remains that when considering the advantages and disad-
vantages of using rules or standards, the EU should do so while 
remembering that it has the luxury of the ongoing relationships 
which its members have built with each other over many 
years247 as well as mutual reliance (which each state has chosen 
to promote) on each other’s economies.  In promulgating inter-
nal directives for the members of the EMU, these nations may 
want to consider the use of a more flexible standard,248 and the 
reliance on their long–term relationships, before they turn to 
more rigid rules.  That way, not only will the EU win the confi-
dence of the world in its endeavors such as the establishment of 
the euro, but it will also command the world’s admiration in its 






 247. Restoring Europe’s Smile, supra note 239 (“Politics will still be messy, 
[but] politics should be messy.”). 
 248. Id. (“A strong, explicit and enforceable principle of subsidiarity is the 
core of the constitution we would like to see.”). 
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